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Benson from the Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty, James Geoly from 
Archdiocese of Chicago Office of Legal 
Services, and Alexander Marks from 
the Chicago-based law firm Burke, 
Warren, Mackay & Serritella. 
Amici curiae that argued for 
extending the ministerial exception 
included: the State of Indiana 
represented by the Office of the 
Attorney General; Robert F. Cochran Jr. 
from Pepperdine Caruso School of Law 
represented by attorneys at Jones Day; 
the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
represented by First Liberty Institute 
in Plano, Texas; the Serbian Orthodox 
Diocese of New Gracanica-Midwestern 
America represented by the Center for 
Law & Religious Freedom; the Ethics 
And Religious Liberty Commission 
Of The Southern Baptist Convention 
represented by Williams Connolly; 
the Indiana Catholic Conference, 
Wisconsin Catholic Conference, and the 
Cardinal Newman Society, represented 
by Southbank Legal: Ladue Curran 
& Kuehn; and, Alliance Defending 
Freedom. 
Amici curiae that argued against 
a categorical bar to discrimination 
claims included the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Catholics 
for Choice, represented by Lambda 
Legal, and Religious Entities, Civil-
Rights Organizations, Unions, and 
Professional Associations, represented 
by Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State. ■
Joseph Hayes Rochman is a law 
student at New York Law School (class 
of 2022).
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the 10th Circuit issued a decision in 
303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 2021 WL 
3157635 (July 26), rejecting a website 
designer’s First Amendment challenge 
to the Colorado Anti-Discrimination 
Act’s prohibition of sexual 
orientation discrimination by public 
accommodations and to a provision 
prohibiting public accommodations 
from communicating that they will 
reject patronage based on sexual 
orientation. The panel consisted of two 
circuit judges appointed by President 
Bill Clinton, Mary Beck Briscoe and 
Michael Murphy, and the circuit’s 
chief judge, Timothy Tymkovich, who 
dissented, appointed by President 
George W. Bush.
303 Creative LLC is Lorie Smith’s 
graphic and website design company. 
Smith claims that she is “willing to 
work with all people regardless of 
sexual orientation,” but she doesn’t want 
to be involved in designing anything 
for a same-sex wedding, due to her 
Christian religious beliefs. According 
to the opinion by Judge Briscoe, Smith’s 
company has not done any wedding 
design business yet, but she claims that 
she plans to do so, so long as she isn’t 
legally required to do work for same-
sex weddings. She would like to be 
able to put a notice on her website that 
she does not design websites for same-
sex weddings because of her religious 
beliefs.
Smith is represented by Alliance 
Defending Freedom (ADF), an 
Arizona-based law firm that specializes 
in religious freedom cases and has 
initiated many legal challenges to anti-
discrimination laws. They filed suit 
against the members of the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission and the state’s 
Attorney General in the U.S. District 
Court in Denver, seeking an injunction 
to block enforcement of the CADA 
against Smith and 303 Creative. 
The court found that these were 
appropriate defendants because the 
method of enforcement is for rejected 
customers to file charges with the Civil 
Rights Division, followed by ALJ 
hearings and decision subject to review 
by the Commission, followed by judicial 
enforcement actions brought by the 
Attorney General’s office.
Smith’s Complaint alleges that 
requiring her to design websites 
for same-sex weddings violates her 
right to free exercise of religion, and 
that the provision prohibiting public 
accommodations from publishing any 
communication that indicates a person’s 
patronage will be refused because of 
their sexual orientation violates her 
freedom of speech. She also claimed that 
the law is unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad. And, she argued, refusing to 
design websites for same-sex weddings 
is not sexual orientation discrimination 
because she would refuse such business 
regardless of the sexual orientation of the 
customer seeking her design services. 
(For example, if a heterosexual parent 
of a gay person approached Smith to 
design a website for the marriage of her 
gay child to another person of the same-
sex, she would reject the business, even 
though the customer is not gay, because 
her religious beliefs reject celebrating a 
same-sex marriage, which is what she 
contends is communicated by a wedding 
website.)
Senior District Judge Marcia S. 
Krieger found that Smith and her 
business lacked standing to challenge 
the Accommodation Clause of that 
Colorado Act, referred to throughout 
the opinion as CADA, since she 
had not begun designing wedding 
websites for customers, but that they 
did have standing to challenge the 
Communication provision. Judge 
Krieger then granted the state’s motion 
for summary judgment on the merits of 
the 1st Amendment claim, and Smith 
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appealed to the 10th Circuit. Smith 
argued on appeal that she had standing 
to raise her claims against the potential 
application of both the Accommodations 
Clause and the Communication Clause. 
Throughout her opinion, Judge Briscoe 
refers to Smith and her business as 
“Appellants,” even though she is the sole 
proprietor and employee of her business.
Writing for the panel majority, Judge 
Briscoe found that the Appellants 
have standing to challenge both the 
Accommodation and Communication 
parts of CADA, but on the merits she 
ruled that Judge Krieger was correct to 
grant the state’s motion for summary 
judgment.
The court agreed with Lorie Smith 
that requiring her to design websites 
for same-sex marriages could be 
considered “compelled speech,” 
because the Accommodation Clause 
“compels Appellants to create speech 
that celebrates same-sex marriages,” 
in that it would “force” them to “create 
websites – and thus, speech – that they 
would otherwise refuse.” And, she 
wrote, “because the Accommodation 
Clause compels speech in this case, it 
also works as a content-based restriction. 
Appellants cannot create websites 
celebrating opposite-sex marriages, 
unless they also agree to serve customers 
who request websites celebrating same-
sex marriages.” As a result, the court 
must subject the provision to strict 
scrutiny, under which it is deemed 
unconstitutional unless it serves a 
compelling state interest and is narrowly 
tailored as necessary to achieve that 
interest.
As part of its analysis, the court 
rejected Smith’s argument that she was 
not proposing to discriminate based on 
the sexual orientation of her customers, 
finding that refusing to provide website 
design services for a same-sex wedding 
necessarily discriminates based on 
sexual orientation.
In this case, the arguments that ADF 
advanced to convince the court that this 
is a compelled speech case came back 
to defeat their claim in the end. While 
it prompted the court to engage in 
strict scrutiny, the majority of the panel 
ultimately decided that this was the rare 
freedom of speech case that survives strict 
scrutiny. ADF emphasized the artistic 
creativity that renders Smith’s services 
“unique” in arguing that requiring Smith 
to design a same-sex marriage website 
was compelling her to speak a message 
that she did not want to speak. But after 
the court concluded that Colorado’s 
decision to include sexual orientation in 
its Accommodations provision signaled 
a compelling state interest to protect 
people from discrimination in obtaining 
goods and services due to their sexual 
orientation, the court’s focus shifted to 
whether the provision was “narrowly 
tailored” to achieve that purpose. 
Is it possible that customers who 
desired the “unique” website design 
services offered by Smith could obtain 
basically the same thing from any 
alternative vendor? ADF did such a 
good job at distinguishing Smith’s 
unique talents that it persuaded the 
court that giving Smith an exemption 
from the statute would defeat the state’s 
compelling interest, because these are 
not fungible services. In the court’s view, 
somebody who provides a uniquely 
personal service has a virtual monopoly 
over provision of that service, so making 
an exception to the non-discrimination 
requirement effectively denies the 
service to the potential customer.
As to the Communication Clause, 
the court ruled that it does not violate 
Free Speech rights, agreeing with 
District Judge Krieger that “Colorado 
may prohibit speech that promotes 
unlawful activity, including unlawful 
discrimination.” Here the court relied 
on a 1973 Supreme Court opinion 
that rejected a newspaper’s First 
Amendment defense against the 
demand by the Pittsburgh Commission 
on Human Relations that it not publish 
“help wanted” classified advertising 
specifying “male” or “female” 
applicants wanted, where a statutory ban 
on sex discrimination in employment 
made such advertising unlawful, even 
though it was clearly speech. See 
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Commission on Human Relations, 413 
U.S. 376 (1973). The court found that 
the statement Smith proposed to put on 
her website “expresses an intent to deny 
service based on sexual orientation – an 
activity that the Accommodation Clause 
forbids and that the First Amendment 
does not protect.”
Turning to ADF’s religious freedom 
arguments, the court found that CADA 
is a neutral law of general applicability, 
and thus under the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), it easily 
survives judicial review. ADF argued 
that the Supreme Court’s Masterpiece 
Cakeshop decision from 2018 should 
dictate a ruling in favor of Lorie Smith 
in this case, based on ADF’s contention 
that the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission is not “neutral” regarding 
religion. Rejecting this argument, Judge 
Briscoe wrote, “Appellants provide 
no evidence that Colorado will ignore 
the Court’s instruction in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, and thus provide no evidence 
that Colorado will enforce CADA in a 
non-neutral fashion.”
The court reported that at a “public 
meeting held a few days after the Court’s 
ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop,” the 
Director of the Commission (and lead 
defendant in this case), Aubrey Elenis, 
stated: “So in these cases going forward, 
Commissioners and ALJs and others, 
including the Staff at the Division, have 
to be careful how these issues are framed 
so that it’s clear that full consideration 
is given to sincerely – what is termed 
as sincerely-held religious objections.” 
Furthermore, Masterpiece was a case in 
which the Division was prosecuting the 
baker for refusing to make a wedding 
cake for a same-sex couple, which the 
court found to be “dissimilar” from this 
case, in which Smith was affirmatively 
challenging the constitutionality of the 
statute in the absence of any prosecution 
ongoing against her.
The court also rejected ADF’s 
arguments that the Communication 
Clause was overbroad and vague, finding 
that its “application to protected speech 
is not substantial relative to the scope of 
the law’s plainly legitimate applications,” 
quoting from Virginia v. Hicks, 539 
U.S. 113 (2003), and that there was no 
vagueness issue in this case, because the 
Communication Clause clearly applied 
to the statement proposed by Smith 
for her website that she would refuse 
to provide her services for same-sex 
weddings.
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“We agree with the Dissent that ‘the 
protection of minority viewpoints is 
not only essential to protecting speech 
and self-governance, but also a good 
in and of itself,’” wrote Briscoe. “Yet, 
we must also consider the grave harms 
caused when public accommodations 
discriminate on the basis of race, 
religion, sex, or sexual orientation. 
Combatting such discrimination is, like 
individual autonomy, ‘essential’ to our 
democratic ideals. We agree with the 
Dissent that a diversity of faiths and 
religious exercise, including Appellants’, 
‘enriches’ our society. Yet, a faith that 
enriches society in one way might also 
damage society in others, particularly 
when that faith would exclude others 
from unique goods or services. In 
short, Appellants’ Free Speech and 
Free Exercise rights are, of course, 
compelling. But so too is Colorado’s 
interest in protecting its citizens from 
the harms of discrimination. And 
Colorado cannot defend that interest 
while also excepting Appellants from 
CADA.”
Chief Judge Timothy Tymkovich’s 
dissent starts with a quote from George 
Orwell (“If liberty means anything 
at all, it means the right to tell people 
what they do not want to hear”) and 
goes downhill from there, finding that 
the First Amendment protects Lorie 
Smith from having to compromise her 
beliefs in order to operate her business. 
He argues that “the majority takes the 
remarkable – and novel – stance that 
the government may force Ms. Smith 
to produce messages that violate her 
conscience. In doing so, the majority 
concludes not only that Colorado has 
a compelling interest in forcing Ms. 
Smith to speak a government-approved 
message against her religious beliefs, 
but also that its public-accommodation 
law is the least restrictive means of 
accomplishing this goal. No case has 
ever gone so far.” He asserted: “The 
Constitution is a shield against CADA’s 
discriminatory treatment of Ms. Smith’s 
sincerely held religious beliefs.”
One might remember Judge 
Tymkovich’s former role as Attorney 
General of Colorado defending 
Amendment 2, the initiative measure 
that forbade the state from protecting 
gay people from discrimination, 
which the Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional as a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause in Romer v. 
Evans in 1996. 
What lies ahead for this case? 
Because ADF represents 303 
Creative and Smith, there are no 
financial constraints on requesting en 
banc review or attempting to get the 
case up to the Supreme Court. ADF is 
an issues organization with an agenda, 
and it routinely seeks further review 
in such cases. Indeed, it immediately 
announced that it would seek review. 
Given the composition of the full 10th 
Circuit, we suspect that ADF may 
attempt to petition the Supreme Court 
directly rather than seek en banc review, 
because this is one of the few circuits 
that was not significantly “rebalanced” 
toward a more conservative stance by 
Donald Trump’s appointments. 
Twelve seats are authorized for the 
10th Circuit, of which two stood vacant 
on July 26, most recently when Judge 
Briscoe elected senior status earlier 
this year. President Joseph Biden 
has nominated Veronica Rossman to 
fill one of these vacancies, and her 
hearing before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee has taken place. Upon her 
likely confirmation, the Circuit will 
have six Democratic appointees and five 
Republican appointees – two by Trump 
and three by George W. Bush. Judge 
Briscoe and the other senior judge on 
the panel in this case, Michael Murphy, 
would be entitled under 10th Circuit 
rules to participate in an en banc review, 
tipping the balance to eight Democratic 
appointees. In what are widely seen as 
“culture war” cases, the political party 
of an appointing president frequently 
correlates with how the judges vote. 
However, if this case gets to the 
Supreme Court, the chances of it 
being reversed seem greater, given the 
eagerness of several members of that 
court to overturn Employment Division 
v. Smith in their concurring opinions 
in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. 
Furthermore, the general disposition 
of the Court’s conservative wing is 
to expand constitutional protection 
for Free Exercise of Religion and for 
free speech for religious practitioners. 
While the Court’s recent denial of 
review in the Arlene’s Flowers case 
from the Washington Supreme Court 
suggests a lack of appetite to take up 
another same-sex wedding case so 
soon, the emboldened conservative 
majority on the Court might vote to 
take another crack at the issue as a 
vehicle for overruling Smith and taking 
a bite out of the impact of Obergefell v. 
Hodges, the Court’s marriage equality 
case, in which Justice Samuel Alito, in 
dissent, predicted the kinds of clashes 
represented by cases such as this one. ■
Arthur S. Leonard is the Robert F. 
Wagner Prof. of Labor and Employment 
Law at New York Law School.
